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Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. Reproduction depends on the payoff
a strategy receives. The payoff depends on the environment that may change over time, on intrinsic
uncertainties, and on other sources of randomness. These temporal variations in the payoffs can
affect which traits evolve. Understanding evolutionary game dynamics that are affected by varying
payoffs remains difficult. Here we study the impact of arbitrary amplitudes and covariances of
temporally varying payoffs on the dynamics. The evolutionary dynamics may be ”unfair“, meaning
that, on average, two coexisting strategies may persistently receive different payoffs. This mechanism
can induce an anomalous coexistence of cooperators and defectors in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and
an unexpected selection reversal in the Hawk-Dove game.
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How species interact depends on the environment and
is thus often uncertain or subject to ongoing variations.
Traditional game theory has assumed constant payoff
structures. Here, we demonstrate by independent meth-
ods that the dynamics of averaged payoff values does not
well approximate the dynamics of fluctuating payoff val-
ues. We show that payoff fluctuations induce qualita-
tive changes in the dynamics. For instance, a Prisoner’s
Dilemma with payoff fluctuations may have the evolu-
tionary dynamics of a Hawk-Dove game with constant
payoff values. As a consequence, cooperators can coexist
with defectors – without any further cooperation main-
taining mechanism such as kin or group selection [1, 2],
reciprocity [3], or spatial structures [4].
First of all, how environmental fluctuations and payoff
stochasticities affect the evolution of interacting species
depends on the time scales. If the fluctuations are much
faster than reproduction, adaptation reaches a stationary
state where species are adapted to living in a rapidly fluc-
tuating environment. If the fluctuations are much slower
than the generation time (e. g. ice ages or geomagnetic
field reversals), adaptation quickly reaches a stationary
state which slowly drifts to follow the fluctuation. Ulti-
mately challenging is the case when the fluctuations and
reproduction are at a similar pace such that adaptation is
continuously following the environmental changes. Here,
we show that such states are subject to noise-induced
transitions. Noise-induced transitions have been studied
in dynamical systems, where the most prominent models
study the effects of additive noise [5–7]. In dynamical
systems, both additive and multiplicative noise can lead
to an array of anomalous noise-induced effects such as
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stochastic resonance [8] and the creation of stable states
[9, 10]. We wish to investigate the consequences of mul-
tiplicative noise in evolutionary game theory that have
not been systematically studied yet.
A number of studies used stochastic models of popu-
lation extinction to analyze the impact of environmental
stochasticity on the extinction risk of small and large
populations [11–13]. Particular attention has been spent
on how the species’ mean time to extinction depends on a
small randomly varying growth rate [14], and on the auto-
correlation of the environmental noise [15–23]. Likewise
in evolutionary game theory, the question of how fixation,
i. e. the transition to the survival of only one species, de-
pends on environmental stochasticity attracted a lot of
attention [24–29]. Recently, how the fixation depends on
environmental stochasticity was also studied in the case
of multi-player games [30].
As opposed to these efforts, we will focus on the im-
pact of payoff fluctuations on the stationary states.
Environmental fluctuations have been integrated in mod-
els for evolutionary games in different ways, including
fluctuating reproduction rates [31–34], selection strength
[27] and population size [29, 35–38]. We integrate envi-
ronmental fluctuations as varying payoff values to study
situations in which the environmental fluctuations affect
the way the species interact. Thereby we assume that all
individuals experience the same environment, meaning
that the payoff values vary with time but not between
individuals.
We explore the landscape of dynamical changes of
evolutionary games induced by such fluctuating pay-
offs. We consider both deterministic (e. g. seasonal) as
well as stochastic fluctuations with varying intensities
and correlations. For a realistic description it is nec-
essary to also include intrinsic noise in finite populations
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2FIG. 1. Selection reversal in a Hawk-Dove game
with constant, periodic and random payoff. (A) de-
scribes a traditional Hawk-Dove game. The population starts
at x1 = x2 = 0.5 (50 % Hawks, 50% Doves) and converges
to an evolutionarily stable state where x1 > x2. Periodically
(B) or randomly fluctuating payoffs (C) shift the evolutionar-
ily stable state such that x1 < x2.
[12, 24, 25, 39]. However, we aim to reveal phenomena
that were unknown so far because they were hidden by
the idealized assumption of constant payoffs. Therefore
we isolate the effects of fluctuating payoffs from the di-
verse effects of intrinsic noise in finite populations by
studying the replicator equation, which describes the evo-
lution of strategies in infinite populations, and the Moran
process [40] for finite but large populations.
Anomalous evolutionarily stable states Multiplicative
growth is a common model that underlies both popula-
tion and evolutionary dynamics. In the simple case of
time-discrete exponential growth, the population num-
ber n is described by nt+1 = rnt. Depending on the
growth rate r, the population will diverge (r > 1), remain
constant (r = 1) or decay (0 ≤ r < 1). However, a time-
dependent growth rate rt can lead to intricate results.
As an example, compare a growth rate that is switching
between 1 and 1.1 with a growth rate that is switching
between 0.6 and 1.5. Both have the same arithmetic av-
erage that is greater than one, but the population will
diverge in the first case because 1 · 1.1 = 1.1 and decay
in the second case because 0.6 · 1.5 = 0.9. In general, the
long-term growth is determined by the geometric mean
of the growth rate r¯, and the population will diverge if
r¯ > 1, remain constant if r¯ = 1 and decay if 0 ≤ r¯ < 1.
Like in this example, multiplicative noise has generally a
net-negative effect on growth in the long-term [41–43].
Models of evolutionary game theory are more complex
but share the same underlying property, which leads to
noise-induced non-ergodic behavior.
In the classical Hawk-Dove game two birds meet and
compete for a shareable resource V , the positive payoff.
If a Hawk meets a Dove the Hawk alone gets the re-
source, if two Doves meet they share the resource and if
FIG. 2. Fluctuations transform a Hawk-Dove game
into a Prisoner’s Dilemma and cause “unfair” stable
coexistence. (A) Shown is the anomalous stationary state
(solid line: stable, dashed line: unstable) of the fraction of
cooperators x1 as a function of the noise intensity. Due to
alternating payoff values the stationary states consist of two
periodic points (green and blue). With increasing intensity,
the dynamical structure of a Hawk-Dove game first changes to
a game without analog in traditional games (N.N.) and finally
to a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. (B) The difference of the
averaged payoffs received by the two players corresponding to
the stationary states of coexistence in A. In the arithmetic
mean the received payoffs are unfair. In the geometric mean
they are equal, as predicted by Eq. (4).
two Hawks meet they fight for the resource, which costs
energy and implies the risk of getting injured, formalized
by a negative payoff −C. Since 50% of the Hawks win
and 50% of the Hawks loose a fight, the average payoff of
a Hawk meeting a Hawk in the limit of an infinite popu-
lation is V−02 +
0−C
2 =
V−C
2 .
Fig. 1 (A) shows that for V = 1 and C = 1.5 the time-
discrete replicator dynamics leads to an evolutionarily
stable state in which a larger population of Hawks coex-
ists with a smaller population of Doves. However, in a
changing environment the payoff matrix will not be con-
stant. For example, the abundance of the food resource
may change periodically with the seasons, or the risk of
death caused by an injury may depend on the presence
of predators. Fig. 1 (B) and (C) show how the evolu-
tionarily stable state can change if V or C fluctuate such
that their averages are still the same as in (A). Simi-
lar to the aforementioned example with the exponential
growth process, the noise has a net-negative effect on the
3long-term growth of the strategies in replicator dynam-
ics, too. Due to the specific structure of the Hawk-Dove
game payoff matrix, the negative effect of the noise of
both V and C is stronger for the population of Hawks
than for the Doves, such that with sufficient noise the
Doves dominate the population in the evolutionarily sta-
tionary state. Next, we show that these anomalous effects
are generic for evolutionary games.
In evolutionary game theory the interactions are usu-
ally formalized in a payoff function, which specifies the
reward from the interaction with another player that is
received by a given individual. In the simplest case, a
game with two strategies is determined by a payoff ma-
trixM with 2×2 matrix elements. We describe the state
of the population as x (
∑
xi = 1), where xi ≥ 0 is the
fraction of players with strategy i ∈ {1, 2}. Players with
strategy i receive the payoff Pi = (Mx)i + b, where the
background fitness b ensures that the payoff is positive.
The assumption that species that receive a higher pay-
off reproduce faster can be formalized by the replicator
equation, which is used here in its time-discrete form [45]
x
(t+1)
i = x
(t)
i · ri(x(t),M), (1)
with ri(x(t),M) =
(Mx(t))i + b
x(t)TMx(t) + b
=
Pi
〈P 〉 (2)
and the average payoff of the population 〈P 〉 = x1P1 +
x2P2.
Following Smith [44], “a population is said to be in an
‘evolutionarily stable state’ [henceforth ESS] if its genetic
composition is restored by selection after a disturbance,
provided the disturbance is not too large.” Hence the ESS
describe the long-term behavior of the system and are
stable stationary states of Eq. (1). For a constant payoff
matrix M , the stationary states x∗ satisfy ri(x∗,M) =
1. If two species coexist, r1(x∗,M) = r2(x∗,M) implies
that both receive the same payoff P1 = P2 = 〈P 〉, as
otherwise the species with the higher payoff would move
the system away from this state due to faster growth.
Now consider continuously changing payoffs with finite
means. The stationary states x∗(t) are solutions of
ri(x∗,M) := lim
T→∞
(
T−1∏
t=0
ri(x
∗(t),M (t))
) 1
T
= 1, (3)
where M (t) is the time-dependent payoff matrix. Equa-
tion (3) defines the geometric average, indicated hence-
forth by the bar. If the payoff matrix changes deter-
ministically with period T a stationary state is a peri-
odic function x∗(t) = x∗(t + T ); if it changes randomly
a stationary state is a random function x∗(t) with dis-
tribution ρ∗(x). But how does one calculate the sta-
tionary states for periodically and randomly changing
payoff matrices? In contrast to normal ESS the sta-
tionary states are not solutions of 〈P1〉 = 〈P2〉, where
〈Pi〉 := limT→∞ 1T
∑T−1
t=0
(
M (t)x∗(t)
)
i
is the arithmetic
time average of the received payoff.
Equation (3) implies that r1(x∗,M) = r2(x∗,M) = 1,
and, using Eq. (2), that
P1 = P2. (4)
If the fluctuations are small, we can approximate the ge-
ometric mean by Pi = 〈Pi〉 − σ
2
i
2〈Pi〉 +O(σ4i ) (see Supple-
mentary Material S1), where σ2i = Var[Pi]. Using this
approximation in Eq. (4) yields
〈P1〉 − σ
2
1
2〈P1〉 = 〈P2〉 −
σ22
2〈P2〉 (5)
Equation (5) shows that 〈P1〉 and 〈P2〉 are generally dif-
ferent, which is why we call these stationary states un-
fair. It includes the case of constant payoff values as a
special case1. Figure 2 (A) illustrates how payoff fluctua-
tions may change the evolutionary dynamics and thereby
transform one game into another game. Figure 2 (B)
shows how the arithmetic and the geometric average of
the payoffs the two species receive deviate (see also Sup-
plementary Fig. S1).
Deterministic payoff fluctuations We first consider
deterministic payoff fluctuations under the replicator
equation (Eq. (1)). To find the stationary state x∗ we
solve Eq. (3). We assume that M (t) is a sequence with
period T . Consequently, the stationary state x∗(t) is pe-
riodic as well and P (x,M) = 1T
∑T
t=0 δ(x− x∗(t))δ(M −
M (t)). Equation (3) reduces to
ri(x∗,M) =
t′+T∏
t=t′
ri
(
x∗(t),M (t)
) 1T = 1. (6)
Note that Eq. (6) has only one free variable because if
one periodic point x∗(t
′) is given, the others are deter-
mined by Eq. (1).
As an illustrative example, assume an alternating pay-
off matrix M (t) = M + (−1)tσM˜ . Then x∗(t) = x∗ +
(−1)t∆x∗ has the same form and can be found by solv-
ing Eq. (6), which reduces to
ri(x∗,M) =
√
ri(x∗(t),M (t)) · ri(x∗(t+1),M (t+1)) = 1.
(7)
Figure 2 shows the stationary states of a game with the
payoff function
M (t) =
(
1.1 0.8
2 0
)
+ (−1)tσ
(−0.33 1
1 0
)
(8)
1 Note that σ1 and σ2 depend on the stationary state x1
and the variance and covariance of the payoff values M =
[m1,m2,m3,m4]. If σ1 = σ2 = 0, Eq. (5) reduces
to 〈P1〉 = 〈P2〉. For small fluctuations we can approxi-
mate them as σ21 ≈ E[x1]2Var[m1] + (1 − E[x1])2Var[m2] +
2(E[x1] − E[x1]2)Cov[m1,m2] and σ22 ≈ E[x1]2Var[m3] + (1 −
E[x1])2Var[m4] + 2(E[x1]− E[x1]2)Cov[m3,m4].
4FIG. 3. Evolutionarily stable states with increasing
fluctuation intensity. Stable and unstable states (solid
and dashed lines) x∗1(σ) for games with alternating payoff
fluctuations (blue and green are the two periodic points).
The payoff matrices are M (t) = [3, 1, 4, 2] + (−1)tσ[0, 0, 0, 1]
in (A), M (t) = [4, 1, 3, 2] + (−1)tσ[1, 0, 0, 1] in (B), M (t) =
[2, 3, 4, 1]+(−1)tσ[0, 1.3, 1.3, 0] in (C) andM (t) = [3, 2, 4, 1]+
(−1)tσ[−0.75, 1,−2, 1] in (D). In each example the back-
ground fitness is b = 10. The names of the games are identified
using criteria described in the Supplementary Material S3.
For the same games but stochastic instead of alternating
noise, the background shows the average of three station-
ary distributions resulting from the initial distributions δ(x),
δ(x− 0.5) and δ(x− 1).
For σ = 0 this is a Hawk-Dove game. For small σ, in fact,
the stationary states predicted by Eq. (7) slightly deviate
from the ESS of the Hawk-Dove game. There is a first
bifurcation at σ ≈ 4.07, from one stable stationary state
(solid curves) to two. At σ ≈ 6.4 there is a second bifur-
cation where the first branch, the stable coexistence, dis-
appears. The bifurcation behavior induces a pronounced
hysteresis effect. Ergodicity breaking causes anomalous
player’s payoff expectations as shown in Fig. 2 (B). The
arithmetic mean of the payoff difference that the play-
ers receive also shows a pronounced hysteresis effect. For
the geometric mean, as predicted by Eq. (4), this effect
is absent.
More generally, fluctuations can even change the num-
ber, the positions and the stability of stationary states
and the dynamics can be structurally very different from
the dynamics of games with constant payoffs, as shown in
Fig. 3. In Fig. 3 (A) large fluctuations induce the onset of
cooperation for the Prisoner’s dilemma as it is effectively
transformed to a Hawk-Dove game with stable coexis-
tence. Figures 3 (B), (C) and (D) show how increasing
fluctuations successively transform three other classical
games either into different classical games or into games
without classical analogs (denoted at “N.N.”).
In the Supplementary Material S2, we show how
anomalous stationary states arise from (correlated)
stochastic payoffs, which is mathematically more involv-
ing but shows similar effects as from deterministic fluc-
tuations.
Discussion Payoff noise in evolutionary dynamics is
multiplicative and as such causes ergodicity breaking.
The consequences have intricate effects on the coevolu-
tion of strategies. Depending on the details of the sys-
tem, on the intensity of the fluctuations and even on their
covariance, ergodicity breaking leads to shifting the pay-
offs out of equilibrium, shifting the stationary states and
thereby to fundamental structural changes of the dynam-
ics.
In evolutionary games with constant payoffs, the condi-
tion for stable coexistence is that all species have equal
growth rates. With fluctuating payoffs this condition
generalizes to equal time-averaged growth rates, which
typically are different from ensemble averages in non-
ergodic systems. When one naively replaces fluctuating
payoffs with their average values, the ensemble averages
of the growth rates are recovered but these averages do
not correctly predict the dynamics.
Games with fluctuating payoffs require a novel classi-
fication that cannot be based on payoff ranking schemes.
We developed a classification that primarily considers the
dynamical structure (Supplementary Material S3). Our
classification for evolutionary games may be applied to
evolutionary games where the payoff structure cannot
be described by a simple payoff matrix, or when other
modifications affect the dynamical structure. Examples
include complex interactions of microbes such as coop-
erating and free-riding yeast cells, where the payoff is a
nonlinear function of the densities [46].
Payoff fluctuations can cause two strategies that coexist
in an evolutionarily stable state to receive different time-
averaged payoffs. However, these “unfair” stable states
are not mutationally stable. Mutations, in fact, would
turn the “unfair” stable state into a meta-game, where
the beneficiary aims to increase and the victim aims to
escape the unfairness. Strategies of this meta-game could
be tuning the adaptation or reproduction rate according
to the environmental fluctuation [34]. Phenotypic plas-
ticity [47] and bet-hedging [48] may reduce the necessity
to adapt at all.
In general, the understanding of evolutionary games in
fluctuating environments may be particularly relevant to
understanding and controlling microbiological systems.
Examples for evolutionary games in microbiology are di-
verse and include yeast cells [46], viruses [49] and bac-
teria [50–53]. Because many of these microbes evolve
in natural and artificial environments which are fluctu-
ating, the presented effects are relevant in biotechnol-
ogy and healthcare. A stable coexistence of antibiotic-
sensitive bacteria with antibiotic-degrading bacteria has
been proven to be a stable state of a Hawk-Dove-like
game [50, 53] if the antibiotic concentration is constantly
above the concentration which the sensitive bacteria
could tolerate alone. Our framework qualitatively de-
scribes the competitive interplay of bacteria strains in a
fluctuating environment, for instance, in a patient who
is given a daily dose of antibiotic instead of a continuous
infusion.
5Simple experimental settings can directly demonstrate
the consequence of non-ergodic anomalous long-term be-
haviors in microbiological systems. Expected shifts and
bifurcations in the stationary states of strategies for
two strains, or species, competing for resources (and
survival) suggest to study the (co)evolutionary dynam-
ics for a fluctuating control parameter c that, e.g.,
switches between two levels in a square-wave fashion,
c = [c+, c−, c+, c−, c+, . . .], where c+ = c + A and
c− = c − A. For increasing fluctuation amplitude A,
the stationary state is expected to shift, or to change
discontinuously, both as a result of ergodicity breaking.
The strongest effect is expected for fluctuations that are
of the same time scale as the reproduction period of the
model organisms. However, quantitative predictions re-
quire much more specific model systems [54].
To conclude, caution is advised when predictions are
based on averaged observables, in particular, averaged
payoffs structures. Our framework predicts anomalous
stationary states as a generic result of ergodicity breaking
in evolutionary dynamics that depend on the amplitude
and covariance of the fluctuations.
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Supplementary Information
Appendix S1: Approximation of the geometric mean
Let X be a random variable with E[X] = µ, E[(X − E[X])2] = σ2 and E[(X − E[X])3] = 0. We can write the
geometric mean of X as
X = µ+ σY = lim
T→∞
T∏
t=0
(µ+ σyt)
1
T , (S1)
where Y is a random variable with E[Y ] = 0, E[(Y −E[Y ])2] = 1 and E[(Y −E[Y ])3] = 0. Now we have the geometric
mean as a function of σ and can write the Taylor series of X(σ) at σ = 0,
X = X(0) +
dX
dσ
(0)σ +
d2X
dσ2
(0)
σ2
2
+
d3X
dσ3
(0)
σ3
6
+O(σ4) (S2)
= µ− σ
2
2µ
+O(σ4) (S3)
Appendix S2: Stochastic payoff fluctuations
1. Replicator equation
How do anomalous stationary states arise from stochastic payoffs? To avoid unnecessary technicalities, we consider
the case of two strategies, in which the state is fully described by a scalar x = x1 (because x2 = 1−x1) and the payoff
M = Y =
(
Y1 Y2
Y3 Y4
)
is a random matrix, where Yj have probability density functions PYj (yj), mean E(Yj) = µj and
variance Var(Yj) = σ2j . In short, we can write the replicator equation as
X(t+1) = f(X(t),Y) (S1)
with f(x,y) = x(t) · (y(t)x(t))1+b
x(t)Ty(t)x(t)+b
. In order to get a function which is injective with respect to Y we define a new
function
f ′(X(t),Y) =

f(X(t),Y)
Y2
Y3
Y4
 (S2)
This function is invertible, hence we can derive the joint probability Pf ′(x(t+1), y2, y3, y4) from the joint probability
PY(y1, y2, y3, y4) = P (y1)P (y2)P (y3)P (y4) by changing variables,
Pf ′(x
(t+1), y2, y3, y4) =
∣∣det[Df ′−1]∣∣PY(f ′−1) (S3)
The stochastic kernel can be derived by marginalizing over y2, y3 and y4.
K(x(t+1)|x(t)) =
∫ ∫ ∫
Pf ′(x
(t+1), y2, y3, y4)×
PY2(y2)PY3(y3)PY4(y4)dy2dy3dy4 (S4)
The Chapman-Kolmogorov equation gives the time evolution of the probability density
P
(t)
X (x) =
∫ 1
0
dx′P (t−1)X (x
′)K(x|x′), (S5)
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FIG. S1. Evolutionarily stable states for constant and periodic payoff. An evolutionary game with a time-constant
payoff matrix (left) compared with a game with a time-varying payoff matrix (right) to exemplify the “unfair” stationary states.
The former payoff matrix represents a Hawk-Dove game and the latter an alternating payoff matrix which has the same time-
average as the constant Hawk-Dove game. (A) and (B) show the dynamics of the two games as a Verhulst diagram with an
example trajectory in red. The two blue curves in (B) correspond to even and odd time points, with the anomalous stationary
states at x?n and x†n. (C) and (D) show the difference of the state one (C) or two (D) time steps later and the current state.
The zero crossings of these lines are the positions of the fixed point and the periodic points. (E) and (F) show the payoff of
species 1 (blue) and species 2 (green). In (E), the equilibrium is at the same position as the fixed point. In (F), species 1
receives a higher time-averaged payoff than species 2 at both periodic points.
To ease the numerical evaluation we use the look-ahead-estimator [1]
P
(t)
X (x) =
1
n
n∑
l=1
K(x|st−1l ) (S6)
where {sl} is a sample of size n drawn from P (t−1)X (x). Starting with an arbitrary initial distribution P (1)X (x) and
successively applying Eq. (S6) converges to a stationary distribution ρ∗(x) = P (∞)X (x) of the stochastically driven
replicator dynamics.
The background in Fig. 3 shows that the stationary distributions, apart from the expected broadening, follow the
behavior of the stable states derived for analogous deterministic fluctuations.
We now demonstrate that the type of the distribution has only little effect on the stationary states. As an example
we use a game with the payoff function
M (t) =
(
1 0.5
2 0
)
+X
(
0 0
1 0
)
(S7)
with the background fitness b = 10. Note that the zero-noise case of this game resembles a Hawk-Dove game. Fig. S2
shows the stationary distributions ρ∗(x1) of the replicator dynamics and the Moran process, where X is either a
uniform, discrete, normal distributed random variable or alternations, each with variance σ = 2. The higher moments
of the noise distribution have little effect on the resulting stationary distribution.
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FIG. S2. Stationary distributions of replicator dynamics (A) and Moran model (B) for different noise sources (σ = 2). Red:
Uniform distributed, green: discrete distributed, blue: normal distributed, black: alternating noise.
2. Moran processes
Employment of Moran processes has been shown to be imperative for the mathematical understanding of stochastic
evolutionary game theory. Despite being conceptionally very different from replicator dynamics, Moran processes are
affected by payoff fluctuations in a similar way.
Consider a Moran process with population size N and payoff matrix M = Y =
(
Y1 Y2
Y3 Y4
)
, where Yj are uncorrelated
random variables with probability density functions PYj (yj) (note that also a deterministically changing payoff with
period T = 2 can be mapped to this formulation2). If the number of individuals playing strategy 1 is i, the expected
payoff received by an individual playing strategy 1 or 2 is
p1(t) =
1
N − 1 [y1(t)(i− 1) + y2(t)(N − i)] (S8)
p2(t) =
1
N − 1 [y3(t)i+ y4(N − i− 1)] (S9)
With selection strength w the fitness of each strategy k = 1, 2 reads
fk(t) = 1− w + wpk. (S10)
2 Periodic fluctuations with period T = 2 can be reinterpreted
as uncorrelated noise: The non-zero transition probabilities are
T (i|i + 2), T (i|i) and T (i|i − 2) (T (i|i) does not appear in the
simplified master equation). With i′ = 2i we have the same
situation as with random values from a probability distribution
P (x) = δ(x+ σ) + δ(x− σ).
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FIG. S3. Anomalous stationary distributions of the Moran model: Theory and simulation. Stationary distributions
calculated by the Fokker-Planck equation and measured stationary distributions using a simulation of the Moran model in
comparison. The payoff matrix is M (t) = [6, 5.5, 7, 5] + Xtσ[0, 0, 1, 0], with Xt randomly switching between +1 and −1. The
population size is N = 1000.
The (non-zero) transition probabilities are
T (i|i+ 1) =
∫
f1(Y)i(N − i)
[f1(Y)i+ f2(Y)(N − i)]N PY(y)dy
+ g(i/N) (S11)
T (i|i− 1) =
∫
f2(Y)i(N − i)
[f1(Y)i+ f2(Y)(N − i)]N PY(y)dy
+ g(1− i/N) (S12)
where we use the abbreviation PY(y)dy = PY1(y1)PY2(y2)PY3(y3)PY4(y4)dy1dy2dy3dy4 and add g(x) = δ(x) to achieve
reflecting boundaries3. The explicit form of the transition probabilities allows to calculate the anomalous stationary
state as the solution of the Fokker-Planck equation for the Moran process [2]
∂tρ(x, t) = −∂x [a(x)ρ(x, t)] + 1
2
∂2x
[
b2(x)ρ(x, t)
]
(S13)
which reads
ρ∗(x) = N exp
(∫ x
0
Γ(x′)dx′
)
(S14)
for
N =
∫ 1
0
exp
(∫ x
0
Γ(x′)dx′
)
dx, (S15)
and
Γ(x) =
1
b(x)
(
2a(x)− db
dx
(x)
)
, (S16)
where a(x) = T (x|x+ 1/N)− T (x|x− 1/N), b(x) = √(T (x|x+ 1/N) + T (x|x− 1/N)) /N , and x = iN .
Figure S3 shows for an example how the stationary distributions, predicted by Eq. (S14), change with increasing
fluctuation intensities compared to stationary distributions of the simulated Moran model.
3 For practical purposes (instead of a half delta function) we
choose g(x) = e−1000x which is differentiable and ensures re-
flecting boundaries.
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FIG. S4. Impact of correlations. Periodic points x? (upper part) and stationary distributions (lower part) for fluctuations
with equal intensity (σ = 5) but different correlation coefficients %. Each plot shows the impact of the correlation between two
entries of the payoff matrix while keeping all other correlations zero.
3. Correlated fluctuations
Payoff values are not necessarily statistically independent from each other, as for example the payoff values M11
and M12 of the Hawk-Dove game in Fig. 1. Thus, it is informative to study the effects of covariation. Consider the
general case of a game specified by the payoff matrix M =
(
Y1 Y2
Y3 Y4
)
. In order to show the impact of the correlations,
we keep the intensity of the fluctuations equal and constant, σY1 = σY2 = σY3 = σY4 = const. The correlations
between Y1, Y2, Y3 and Y4 are specified by six independent correlation coefficients on which the resulting stationary
states depend in a nonlinear way. For simplicity, Fig. S4 shows only the isolated impact of each pairwise correlation
keeping the others zero.
This shows that in addition to intensities, the anomalous stationary states are crucially determined by the correlation
of the fluctuations. Yet, we can show analytically that there is a special case (corr(Y1, Y3) = corr(Y2, Y4) = 1) for
which the stationary state becomes completely independent of the fluctuation intensities. Assume that x∗ is the
stationary state of a game with constant payoff matrix M0, such that r(x∗,M0) = 1. If we add noise with correlation
coefficient 1 between column values,
M(t) = M0 + M˜(t) =
(
a b
c d
)
+
(
f1(t) f2(t)
f1(t) f2(t)
)
, (S17)
then
r
(
x∗,M0 + M˜(t)
)
=
(M0x
∗)i + (M˜(t)x∗)i + b
x∗TM0x∗ + x∗T M˜(t)x∗ + b
(S18)
=
(M0x
∗)i + (f1(t)x∗1 + f2(t)x
∗
2) + b
x∗TM0x∗ + (f1(t)x∗1 + f2(t)x
∗
2) + b
= 1 (S19)
where the second step uses x21 + x1x2 = x1 and x22 + x1x2 = x2 and the last step uses (M0x∗)i = x∗TM0x∗ following
from the assumption. Consequently, in this case the stationary state does not depend on the noise intensity.
Appendix S3: Classification of games with payoff fluctuations
1. Generalized criteria
A symmetric game defined by a constant 2 × 2 payoff matrix can be classified as one out of 12 game classes with
distinct dynamical structures, e. g. Prisoner’s Dilemma, Hawk-Dove game, etc. This traditional classification is based
on the rank of the four values in the payoff matrix, see middle column in table S1. The name of a game allows
a more intuitive understanding than the position in the four dimensional payoff space. However, this classification
S6
cannot be applied to time-varying payoff matrices because the ranks may be time-dependent. Therefore we propose
a classification for evolutionary games based on three characteristics: (1) the dynamics of the evolutionary game
(the number of stationary states and their stability), (2) the type of social interaction (how the payoff differs between
stationary states for one player compared to the other player) and (3) the effect on the community (how the total payoff
of player one and two differs between stationary states). The classification scheme and its criteria are summarized in
Fig. S5. Based on these criteria a game class is defined as a tuple [c1, c2, c3, c4], where
c1 = Sign
(
du1
dx1
(0)
)
· n∗
c2 = Sign (P1(1)− P1(0))
c3 = Sign (P2(1)− P2(0))
c4 = Sign (〈P 〉(1)− 〈P 〉(0)) ,
(S1)
where u1 = dx1dt , Pi(x) =
(
M
(
x
1− x
))
i
denotes the payoff of a strategy i player, 〈P 〉 = xP1 + (1− x)P2 the average
payoff in the population and n∗ = ‖{x∗1 : u1(x∗1) = 0}‖ the number of anomalous stationary states. This classification
can be applied to games with varying payoff matrices and even games with nonlinear payoff functions. The scheme is
developed for time-continuous dynamics. The formulation for time-discrete dynamics is analogous. Note also that the
criteria (c2-c4) of Eqs. (S1) can be written in a more general form to describe also non-monotonic payoff functions.
Table S1 lists the 12 traditional games defined by the payoff rank criteria and their corresponding definitions with
the presented generalized criteria.
2. Proof that payoff rank criteria and generalized criteria are equivalent in case of constant payoffs
Since the method is the same for all games we show it only for the Prisoner’s Dilemma to exemplify the proof. We
assume that the dynamics of the game are described by the continuous replicator equation u1 := x˙1 = x1((Mx)1 −
xTMx) with a constant payoff matrix M =
(
m1 m2
m3 m4
)
. According to the generalized criteria a Prisoner’s Dilemma
is defined as [−2,+1,+1,+1]. The −2 tells us that the first stationary state at x1 = 0 is stable and the second at
x1 = 1 is unstable,
du1
dx1
(0) < 0⇔ m2 < m4 (S2)
du1
dx1
(1) > 0⇔ m3 > m1. (S3)
Further the three +1 tell us that the payoff of both players and the total payoff of the population at x1 = 1 is higher
than at x1 = 0,
P1(1) > P1(0)⇔ m1 > m2 (S4)
P2(1) > P2(0)⇔ m3 > m4 (S5)
〈P 〉(1) > 〈P 〉(0)⇔ m1 > m4. (S6)
Criteria (S2) to (S6) are equivalent to m2 < m4 < m1 < m3 or in the payoff rank notation [3, 1, 4, 2], which defines a
traditional Prisoner’s Dilemma.
3. Application of the generalized criteria on an alternating payoff matrix
As an illustrative example we show that the game in Fig. 2 at noise intensity 8, where the payoff matrix is
M (t) =
(
1.1 0.8
2 0
)
+ 8 · (−1)t
(−0.33 1
0 0
)
, is a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
As we can see in the figure there are two stationary states, a stable state at x1 = 0 and an unstable state at x1 = 1,
consequently c1 = −2. From the expected payoff Pi(x1) = 12
(
M even t
(
x1
1− x1
)
+Modd t
(
x1
1− x1
))
evaluated at the
stationary states (P1(0) = 0.8, P1(1) = 1.1, P2(0) = 0 and P2(1) = 2) it follows that c2 = +1 and c3 = +1. For the last
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FIG. S5. Case differentiation of game characteristics. An evolutionary game with two strategies and constant payoff
has one out of (A) four possible dynamical structures (either two or three stationary states with the first one either stable or
unstable), (B) four possible combinations of strategy 1’s impact on the payoff of the individuals (positive or negative impact
on the payoff of strategy 1 and 2 players), and (C) two possible kinds of strategy 1’s impact on the total payoff of all players
(positive or negative).
criteria we evaluate the population payoff 〈P 〉(x1) = x1P1 + (1− x1)P2 at the stationary states (〈P 〉(0) = P2(0) and
〈P 〉(1) = P1(1)), which results in c4 = +1. To summarize, the game satisfies the generalized criteria [−2,+1,+1,+1].
According to table S1 this defines a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
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Name Payoff rankcriteria
Generalized
criteria
Hawk-Dove [3, 2, 4, 1]
[1, 4, 2, 3]
[+3,+1,+1,+1]
[+3,−1,−1,−1]
Battle [2, 3, 4, 1]
[1, 4, 3, 2]
[+3,−1,+1,+1]
[+3,−1,+1,−1]
Hero [1, 3, 4, 2]
[2, 4, 3, 1]
Compromise [1, 2, 4, 3]
[3, 4, 2, 1]
[−2,−1,+1,−1]
[+2,−1,+1,+1]
Deadlock [2, 1, 4, 3]
[3, 4, 1, 2]
[−2,+1,+1,−1]
[+2,−1,−1,+1]
Prisoner’s Dilemma [3, 1, 4, 2]
[2, 4, 1, 3]
[−2,+1,+1,+1]
[+2,−1,−1,−1]
Stag Hunt [4, 1, 3, 2]
[2, 3, 1, 4]
[−3,+1,+1,+1]
[−3,−1,−1,−1]
Assurance [4, 1, 2, 3]
[3, 2, 1, 4]
[−3,+1,−1,+1]
[−3,+1,−1,−1]
Coordination [4, 2, 1, 3]
[3, 1, 2, 4]
Peace [4, 3, 1, 2]
[2, 1, 3, 4]
[+2,+1,−1,+1]
[−2,+1,−1,−1]
Harmony [4, 3, 2, 1]
[1, 2, 3, 4]
[+2,+1,+1,+1]
[−2,−1,−1,−1]
Concord [4, 2, 3, 1]
[1, 3, 2, 4]
TABLE S1. Criteria for strict symmetric games. The middle column shows the rank of the values in the payoff matrix
M = [a, b, c, d], e. g. [3, 2, 4, 1] means d < b < a < c [3]. The right column shows the values of the criteria defined in the text.
